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 2 
Introduction: Capital mobility, globalisation and the ‘end of geography’ 
 
The globalisation hypothesis has altered many of the common-sense ‘truths’ around 
which the social world is organised.*  In particular, globalisation is thought to restrict the 
parameters of the politically and economically possible.  Indeed, the notion of 
constrained choice is so pronounced that we are increasingly confronted with the image 
of globalisation’s ‘logic of no alternative’; an image which is predicated on the 
assumption of perfect capital mobility.  Capital is considered to be sufficiently rational to 
take advantage of enhanced exit options from the national economy in circumstances in 
which its interests are served by moving off-shore.  Moreover, global markets are also 
assumed to have exploited contemporary technological developments to such an extent 
that they now clear instantaneously; consequently, allowing capital to further its interests 
wherever in the world new profit opportunities arise.  Thus, we are presented with the 
fundamental ‘reality’ of globalisation as currently narrated throughout much of the west: 
unless the market can be allowed to restore a competitive global equilibrium, capital will 
exit high-wage, high-cost western economies and re-locate in lower-wage, lower-cost, 
newly industrialising economies.  Under the auspices of ever more hostile wage 
competition from the newly industrialising economies, globalisation is commonly 
presumed to act as a trigger for an ‘inevitable’ job displacement effect as capital deserts 
the advanced industrialised economies. 
 
Capital mobility is thus most frequently thought of in spatial terms.  Capital’s rational 
profit-seeking instincts drive it away from high-cost national economies and re-direct it 
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towards lower-cost locations.  Such an image has subsequently been used to discipline 
the claims of a western labour force which is relatively static in relation to capital’s new 
hyper-mobility.1  Whilst labour tends to be locked via socialisation processes into distinct 
national economic spaces, the globalisation of capital markets is assumed to be eroding 
the ability of national states to regulate such spaces as a means of imposing a similarly 
distinct national identity upon capital.  The physical barriers between national economies 
are now assumed to mean little in the face of hyper-mobile capital.  Moreover, the 
statutory barriers between national economies have been relaxed as capital controls have 
been systematically withdrawn.  It is assumed that we no longer live in a world in which 
there can be an institutionalised set of rules capable of holding in check the restlessness 
of the capital markets.  In short, geography is commonly thought to be an ever more 
marginal constraint on the activity of capital.  As Richard O’Brien argues, capital flows 
can no longer be condensed within ‘specific geographical frameworks such as the nation-
state or other typical regulatory jurisdictional territories’.2
 
 
Globalisation is thus assumed to introduce a qualitatively new understanding of social 
space: a spatiality from which the concepts of distance and territory have been abstracted.  
Unlike its predecessors, the new global regime of capitalist accumulation is released from 
the constraints of territory which once were imposed by discrete and autonomously acting 
national states.  As a consequence, expanded accumulation is no longer reliant on a social 
structure which is centred on, and embedded within, national social and political 
formations.  According to Jan Aart Scholte, social, political and economic relations are 
now played out on ‘a “supraterritorial” plane’.  ‘Global relations are not links at a 
 4 
distance across territory but circumstances without distance and relatively disconnected 
from particular location.’3
 
  Furthermore, an accelerating power asymmetry is assumed to 
have emerged between: on the one hand, governments which are locked into a specific 
geographical structure - their own national territory; and, on another, global capital 
markets which operate at a higher level of abstract spatiality - the ‘supraterritorial’.  
Viewed through the perspective of an increasing powerlessness of the state, we see the 
emergence of the central claim of the globalisation hypothesis.  With reference to 
economic policy in particular, national states are now typically thought to have little 
capacity to act autonomously.  As a reflection of the ‘inevitable logic of globalisation’, 
the new conventional wisdom of contemporary public policy assumes that the focus of 
economic policy-making has been displaced from the national state into global markets. 
It is plain to see, therefore, that a whole host of political consequences will emerge from 
the formulation of knowledge about globalisation.  Hence, it is imperative that such 
knowledge is based on accurate understandings of the global system, and of the economic 
transformations which are said to have been instrumental in the creation of such a system.  
The remainder of this paper concentrates on arguably the most important aspect of these 
transformations: capital’s supposed ‘hyper-mobility’.  In order to examine the 
relationship between the mobility of capital and the politics of globalisation, two 
distinctions in particular will be emphasised.  The first is relatively well-rehearsed within 
the IPE literature and concerns the distinction between productive capitals and financial 
capitals.  It will be shown that these different fractions of capital have conceptually 
distinct functions and logics of action; moreover, that such logics cohere into very 
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different mobility options.  For example, the following section of the paper concentrates 
on the mobility of productive capitals.  For these capitals, the reality of international 
capital flows does little to sustain the rhetoric of globalisation.  Indeed, far from 
productive interests using a new-found mobility to establish a truly global circuit of 
capital, the available empirical evidence highlights that these interests have retained an 
essentially national identity. 
 
Furthermore, such a conclusion appears to hold not only in relation to the mobility of 
productive capitals.  In the second section of the paper, it is argued that the mobility of 
financial capitals is also routinely over-stated.  Given that the spatial mobility hypothesis 
is a gross exaggeration of the reality of contemporary capital flows, it is necessary to 
dispute the assumption that economic globalisation implies a political logic of no 
alternative.  Insofar as policy alternatives are circumscribed at all by the current structure 
of the international political economy of finance, this is the result of the distinctively neo-
liberal financial regime which has been created as a consequence of prior political 
interventions.  In relaxing previously institutionalised controls on the short-term 
movement of financial funds, this neo-liberal regime has facilitated new opportunities for 
realising profit through trading short-term financial assets.  As a result, an increasing 
proportion of available capital funds are being directed towards financial markets; the 
corollary of which is an emergent tendency towards capital shortage in productive 
sectors.  A clear disparity now exists between the volume of funds being prepared for 
productive purposes and those being prepared for non-productive purposes.  However, 
and despite the claims of contemporary conventional wisdoms, the heightened incidence 
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of productive capital shortage is not to be explained with reference to any ‘logic’ of 
globalisation, which sees capital depart the high-wage, high-cost locations of the west in 
search of lower-cost locations on the industrialising periphery.  In short, productive 
capital shortage is not to be explained with reference to arguments about the spatial 
mobility of capital.  Instead, it is the result of the current global neo-liberal financial 
regime providing a range of incentives for rationally-acting, profit-seeking capital 
investors to concentrate an ever larger proportion of their investments in financial assets.  
Thus, the dynamics of productive capital shortage are to be understood in relation to 
arguments about the functional mobility of capital. 
 
The heuristic distinction between the spatial mobility of capital and the functional 
mobility of capital is the second such distinction to be emphasised throughout this paper.  
Whilst the existing IPE literature tends to concentrate on the political implications of 
capital’s spatial mobility, this paper will focus in its later sections on capital’s functional 
mobility.  Indeed, the case for re-regulating both the global financial markets [see section 
two] and the financial futures markets [see section three] is made with direct reference to 
the functional mobility of capital.  Given that the confines of space within which the 
paper is written do not allow for a detailed policy proposal to be presented, the paper 
emphasises instead the principles (both economic and political) which would inform a 
policy of re-regulation. 
 
The desire to address the increasing incidence of productive capital shortage in the west 
lies at the heart of policy proposals to re-regulate the global financial markets.  With this 
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end in mind, James Tobin, for example, has introduced proposals for an international 
currency transactions tax which aims to reduce the volatility of financial prices and 
restore some semblance of stability to domestic interest rates and exchange rates.4
 
  The 
creation of a highly liberalised global financial environment has, over the past twenty 
years, triggered a quite dramatic shift in the liquidity preferences of capital holders.  
Short-term financial assets can now be traded in the virtual absence of transactions costs.  
This has allowed investors to take up certain speculative positions which are capable of 
satisfying high liquidity demands.  As such, the increasingly ‘costless’ nature of financial 
trading has offered sufficient incentives for investors to liquidate long-term productive 
assets in order to release more funds for financial investments.  Moreover, these new 
flows of financial funds are frequently deployed to speculate against forward movements 
in interest and exchange rates; consequently, injecting new sources of instability into 
these rates.  This in turn acts as a further disincentive to invest in new productive capacity 
and, hence, exacerbates what are now the significant capacity shortfalls visible in 
productive sectors visible throughout much of the west.  Whilst this briefest of sketches 
of a Tobin-style tax suggests that its imposition would be driven by an essential economic 
logic, arguments for currency transactions taxes are just as much political arguments as 
they are economic arguments.  As such, it is to the political implications of re-regulating 
financial markets that the paper turns in the concluding section. 
It is in this sense, more than any other, that the ‘P’ is being put back into IPE: in this case, 
through the attempt to repoliticise the dominant discourse of globalisation by replacing 
the received wisdom of capital’s spatial mobility with an understanding of capital’s 
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functional mobility.  The conventional focus on spatial mobility is rooted in the 
marginalist paradigm of neo-classical economics.  This suggests that an autonomous 
sphere of market relations governs the locational decisions of firms in line with implicit 
cost/benefit analyses.  Insofar as the alternative focus on functional mobility advanced 
here emphasises the political construction of financial market relations, then, this article 
also represents an attempt to repoliticise orthodox western economic discourse more 
generally.  As such, it stands in direct opposition to those who would seek to unify social 
scientific enquiry in a new political economy which involved the application of orthodox 
economic methods to the analysis of political phenomena.5  By contrast, it harks back to 
a pre-marginalist political economy to the extent that it moves away from a 
fundamentally neo-classical analysis of the means of choosing between competing ends 
in conditions of scarcity - embodied, in this instance, in the ‘spatial mobility’ hypothesis.  
Instead, the image of the classical political economy of the nineteenth century, and 
especially of its concern for the social basis of capitalism, is invoked through the 




1. The internationalisation of production and the spatial mobility of capital 
 
With capital mobility conceived of in spatial terms, productive capital is assumed to be 
free to roam the world in search of the most profitable locations.  As a result, 
globalisation is assumed to have locked national states into a competitive dynamic in 
which they are pitted directly one against another in the struggle for supremacy on 
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international markets.  The globalisation hypothesis consequently comes complete with 
its own blueprint for future political action: wake up and shape up to the demands of 
global economic competition.  As Joe Rogaly notes, this political blueprint is based on 
the perhaps paradoxical premise that, over time: ‘politics [itself] will matter less, 
eventually hardly at all’.7
 
  Political parties around the western world have been quick to 
act on this assumption, moving swiftly to dampen down expectations of what remains 
feasible in terms of governance strategies; and, as they do, announcing repeatedly that 
they simply have no choice but to reverse the welfare gains made by labour under 
previous accumulation regimes. 
Thus, the notion of spatially-mobile capital has been used to launch attacks against 
existing western labour standards.  Relatively unskilled western workers are being 
increasingly exploited as their wages are downsized ever more aggressively in the name 
of global competition.  Capitalist class actors have therefore been able to harness the 
political rhetoric of globalisation to turn the material ‘reality’ of globalisation into new 
forms of oppression to be asserted over those with least power in society.  As such, we 
have seen an increasing marginalisation of a significant segment of the western 
workforce.  National states have met the demands of capitalist class actors for greater 
flexibility to augment their greater spatial mobility by forcibly inserting themselves into 
national wage relations to lower existing labour standards.  Moreover, viewed through the 
perspective of the dominant political understanding of our times, such actions are seen as 




Two main objections can be raised to globalisation’s ‘logic of no alternative’, though.  
The first is empirical.  It focuses on the assumption that, as a reflection of the fact that all 
capital markets now clear perfectly, productive capital really does roam the whole globe 
in search of new profit opportunities.  However, there is no evidence that capital markets 
actually do clear perfectly in this way.  Indeed, the available empirical indicators tend to 
point to an altogether different conclusion.  Almost all neo-liberal renditions of the 
globalisation hypothesis exaggerate the degree of de-territorialisation.  It is true that 
certain phenomena now appear to exist at a supraterritorial level.  The Internet, for 
example, plus the electronic mass media, global communications networks and 
electronically-relayed financial flows: all now transcend conventional understandings of 
geography.  Yet this is not to say that all economic relations do likewise.  As James 
Mittelman suggests, for instance, in terms of production relations: ‘the compression of 
time and space is limited because flows of capital and technology must eventually touch 
down in distinct places’.9
 
 
Therefore, legitimate doubts can be raised about the extent to which productive capitals 
are mobile.  Indeed, the realities of economic production suggest that the threat of co-
ordinated disinvestment by these capitals is simply not credible.10  For, the moment that 
financial assets are made concrete into productive investments, all future mobility options 
are severely curtailed.  Moreover, the vast majority of productive investments are not 
made by spatially-footloose capitals, but are sourced locally.  Domestic producers 
continue to dominate the supply of domestic consumption markets.  This is amply 
demonstrated by the fact that, throughout the 1990s, the Triad poles of North America, 
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Western Europe and South-East Asia, despite being the world’s major trading regions, 
have exported less than the equivalent of one-sixth of their respective GDPs.11
Foreign investment in US stocks and bonds [may well have] risen, but in 1993 it 
remained only 6 per cent of US stocks, and 14 per cent of corporate bonds.  And 
fully 95 per cent of investment by Americans remained in domestic stocks of 
bonds.
  
Furthermore, whilst domestic consumption demands continue to be satisfied via the 
circuit of domestic capital, these domestic producers remain predominantly domestically 
owned.  As Frances Fox Piven explains, for example, in relation to trading on Wall 
Street, supposedly the most ‘open’ stock exchange in the world: 
12
Such figures are by no means atypical.  In December 1989, for instance: ‘US investors 
held 94 per cent of their stock-market wealth in their home country stocks, Japanese 
investors 98 per cent in home stocks, and UK investors 82 per cent’.
 
13  Contrary to the 
globalisation hypothesis as narrated by contemporary neo-liberals, then, productive 
capitals have in fact remained overwhelmingly within the borders of the national 
economy.  Despite the common assumption that globalisation conflates with 
supraterritoriality, the physical barriers of territorial geography are still of intrinsic 
importance in terms of the location of productive investments.14
 
 
The second objection to globalisation’s ‘logic of no alternative’ also questions the 
assumption that global capital markets clear perfectly.  It focuses not on the spatial 
mobility of capital, however, but on its functional mobility.  This view invites us to look 
past the assumption that capital mobility has the most immediate effect upon our lives 
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through the way in which investment flows around the world seeking new profit 
opportunities, leaving an ever widening track of devastation and unemployment in its 
wake.  Instead, it suggests that we concentrate on the circuits of capital through which 
financial assets are made concrete into productive investments.  In textbook analyses, the 
financial system acts to reconcile the monetary and investment subsystems of the 
economy.  The increasing sophistication of the financial system should in theory have 
made this task more straightforward in recent years.  Yet, at the same time as there has 
been a surge in activity in international financial markets, this activity has become 
increasingly disembedded from the real economy.  The circuit of capital has become 
progressively more dislocated, consequently impeding productive investments.  With the 
international financial markets devouring more and more capital in the functional form of 




It is this dynamic, and not in any sense the ‘natural laws of globalisation’, which lies at 
the heart of the current inability of western labour markets to provide adequate levels of 
stable, high-quality employment.  The growing casualisation and general under-
utilisation of the western workforce is a direct result of the capacity shortfalls which 
reflect capital shortage.  As such, productive capital shortage should be understood in 
terms of an excessive volume of resources being devoted to financial transactions.  In 
viewing the problems of contemporary political economy in this way, it is necessary to 
revise some of the claims which have been made about capital mobility, especially in 
circumstances in which capital mobility has been conceived of purely in spatial terms.  
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For example, Mittelman’s assertion that ‘flows of capital and technology must eventually 
touch down in distinct places’ has been used to argue that the spatial mobility of capital is 
more limited than the dominant understanding of globalisation insists.  Yet this argument 
must now be seen through a different lens.  If we choose to interpret capital mobility in 
functional terms, then we will be drawn towards the conclusion that the main concern of 
today’s public policy-makers should be that an increasing volume of capital does not now 
‘touch down’ at all - in the sense of it failing to be made concrete into productive 
investments.  Having shifted the debate away from the question of capital’s spatial 
mobility, it is to the question of capital’s functional immobility that the paper now turns. 
 
 
2. The internationalisation of financial markets and the functional immobility of money 
assets 
 
Since western governments began the indiscriminate relaxation of capital controls 
following the demise of the Bretton Woods settlement, the world’s financial markets 
have become increasingly dissociated from the productive realm.  As Kurt Hübner 
explains, financial markets no longer exist solely as a means of optimising financial 
portfolios; ‘the money market itself has become a genuine realm for the valorisation of 
capital’.16  As a reflection of heightened liquidity preferences amongst potential 
investors, an ever greater proportion of capital holdings have been switched from 
productive to financial assets.  Consequently, an ever smaller proportion of money assets 
have been prepared for non-financial, or GDP, purposes.17  Productive interests have 
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been ‘crowded out’ by financial interests to such an extent in recent years that, 
throughout the west, we are witness to a situation of acute productive capital shortage. 
 
Today’s international capital markets allow for short-term liquidity ratios to be 
maximised through the twenty-four-hour trading of money assets.  At the same time, 
however, they are also responsible for fostering an aversion amongst capital investors for 
taking up longer-term positions.  These markets offer such liquid contracts on short-term 
financial transactions that they remove many of the incentives for cashing in money 
assets and turning them into productive investments; the returns to which accrue over 
much longer time horizons.  Moreover, the speed with which financial transactions can 
now be administered has impacted upon the trend level of interest rates in such a way so 
as to act as a further disincentive for engaging in productive investments.  As Benn Steil 
argues: ‘savers are now highly yield-sensitive’18
 
 and, as a result, demand greater 
compensation for giving up additional liquidity when they make their savings available to 
source new productive investments.  Such compensation has tended to take the form of 
higher interest payments. 
The history of the post-Bretton Woods international political economy shows that the 
trend level of interest rates has risen every time a further liberalisation of the financial 
environment has made it feasible for a subsequent increase in liquidity preferences to be 
satisfied.  In general, the rate of interest is now appreciably higher than it was in the era 
in which financial flows were policed by capital controls.  The overriding desire for 
financial liquidity, which has been made manifest in successive increases in the trend rate 
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of interest, has ensured that productive investors (especially in the small- and medium-
sized firm sector) typically face excessive capital costs.  The very prospect of these costs 
has, on many occasions, been sufficient to price potential investors out of production 
markets.  Liquidity demands provide the dynamic, therefore, which ends with there being 
insufficient flows of investment to absorb all the excess supply currently observed in 
western labour markets. 
 
The search for additional liquidity within international financial markets has sent 
shockwaves through western labour markets.  Financial transactions can now easily be 
varied both in form and in geographical location.19  Such flexibility has significantly 
lowered transactions costs, and the ever more ‘costless’ nature of financial trading has led 
to a massive increase in financial flows.  Furthermore, over two-thirds of the flows of 
financial funds are now so-called ‘stateless money’.  This places it outside the effective 
control of national states and, as such, is assumed to have tied national governments to 
strict constraints in terms of liquidity ratios, interest rates and profit opportunities.  As 
such, the high liquidity preferences which dominate contemporary financial markets also 
make expansionary changes to domestic monetary policy more difficult to administer.  
Even modest uncertainty within the financial markets as to whether national governments 
will be able to resist the temptation to unilaterally expand their economies by lowering 
interest rates can result in significant moves in the ‘sentiments’ of the financial markets.  
The markets can be expected to re-position themselves in order to re-assert the strict 
interest rate constraint which now appears to face all national governments.20  
Governments are assumed to be powerless to lower national interest rates below a trend 
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level which the markets find ‘acceptable’ in order to boost productive investment in the 
domestic economy.  Set in this context, increasing financial market integration has 
effectively sealed off the expansionary option for national governments.  For, in the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation, those holding capital assets are thought to be free 
to escape the effects of an expansionary monetary policy by re-locating elsewhere, into 
an environment in which the interest rate constraint is observed more closely. 
 
Once again, in this understanding of the contemporary international political economy, 
capital mobility is being conceived of in spatial terms.  Viewed through this perspective, 
the problem posed by international capital mobility is that the mere threat of extensive 
short-term financial outflows is often sufficient to deter a government from considering 
policies which may be treated with suspicion in the markets.21
 
  In circumstances in which 
market confidence is lost, rationally-acting capital investors will be expected to transfer 
their financial assets to another country, one in which the principles of ‘sound money’ are 
applied with greater vigour.  Thus, with physical, statutory and technological barriers to 
shifting capital no longer considered to be effective in the face of capital’s hyper-
mobility, we have been conditioned to expect an ever increasing amount of cross-border 
short-term financial transactions.  In the political rhetoric of globalisation, these 
transactions are designed to act as ‘correctives’ to national monetary authorities which 
temporarily step out of line and assert their theoretical independence in terms of domestic 
policy. 
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Historically, autonomous national monetary policy interventions have been aimed 
towards changing the settings of interest rates in order to restore internal balance to the 
domestic economy.  Yet, as Tobin argues, ‘vast funds are [now] prepared [solely] to 
arbitrage away differences in national interest rates’.22  Thus, domestic interest rates 
increasingly are being determined through international financial markets which are 
thought to clear instantaneously.  In this world of perfect spatial capital mobility, 
financial assets denominated in different currencies become perfect substitutes.23
 
  As 
such, they cannot offer divergent returns in different domestic currencies without at the 
same time sparking substantial financial flows.  For, it is commonly assumed that those 
holding capital assets will take advantage of their supposedly unlimited mobility options 
to seek out those locations in which the highest rates of interest are to be found.  
Moreover, it is further commonly assumed that the spatial mobility of capital will, over 
time, ensure that all domestic interest rates converge upon an international average. 
However, the actual evidence regarding domestic interest rates does little to bear out this 
claim.  As Robert Zevin has shown, the correlation between short-term interest rates in 
the world’s major financial centres is now no higher than it was one hundred years ago.24  
The computer revolution is regularly assumed to have facilitated the instantaneous 
adjustment in financial prices, as massive flows of capital are released at the push of a 
button to trigger the adjustment mechanisms.  As we can see here, though, even under 
such circumstances, these prices have shown no more of a tendency to converge than 
they did when their adjustment required for gold to be physically transported between the 
world’s financial centres on ocean liners.  Therefore, contrary to the predictions of the 
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financial globalisation hypothesis, we continue to live in a world of interest rate 
differentials.  Viewed through the perspective of capital’s spatial mobility, this suggests 
that savers around the world should be attracted to certain financial centres at the 
prospect of above-average interest rates.  Indeed, it is stated clearly in the dominant 
rhetoric of globalisation that the integration of the world’s financial markets allows for 
financial investors faced with low domestic interest rates simply to transfer their funds 
overseas.  As such, savings are assumed to be more mobile than previously; and, as 
savers exploit these mobility options, the historic link observed between domestic 
investment and domestic saving is further assumed to be undermined.  In fact, the two are 
no longer thought to bear any necessary relation.  However, once again, empirical 
evidence does little to support this view.  When the rate of domestic investment is 
regressed onto the rate of domestic saving, a significant correlation remains.25
 
  This 
suggests that international flows of long-term financial capital are more restricted than 
generally assumed.  Far from long-term assets moving freely across borders, national 
economies remain more independent in spatial terms than the globalisation hypothesis 
would have us believe. 
Such a conclusion suggests once more that current conventional wisdoms exaggerate 
both the extent of capital’s spatial mobility and the extent to which such mobility 
circumscribes the autonomy of national economic policy-makers.26  Yet, as is shown 
below, should we focus instead on capital’s functional mobility, it is still possible to 
argue that the concentration of an increasing proportion of capital funds in purely 
speculative financial markets does threaten to undermine the policy autonomy of national 
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governments.  The effects of the increase in speculative activities have been felt most 
spectacularly in the international foreign exchange markets.  This is now the largest and 
most liquid financial market the world has ever known, with a daily turnover averaging 
more than US$1.2 trillion of short-term funds.27  Currency trading incurs negligible 
transactions costs, allowing speculators easy access into markets and enabling them to 
profit from fluctuating interest and exchange rates.  However, in recent years, it has 
become increasingly evident that speculative activities are not directed solely at existing 
differentials between countries in terms of interest and exchange rates.  Vast sums of 
short-term assets are moved in anticipation of emerging differentials or even, as is 
becoming ever more common these days, to force such changes.  The sheer volume of 
short-term capital movements associated with contemporary currency crises is out of all 
proportion to the underlying interest and exchange rate differentials in existence before 
the onset of speculative activities.28
 
  Instead, it is speculators themselves who whip up 
monetary storms by triggering capital movements of such magnitude that they ensure that 
adjustments in both interest and exchange rates must follow. 
Speculative attacks pose a significant threat to national policy-makers because of the 
capacity that they bear to become self-fulfilling.29  If market traders generate the 
expectation that a specific currency devaluation would prove to be in their interest, then 
they are able to make that devaluation a reality.  Speculative capital outflows can be 
initiated at will to cause a run on any currency.  In turn, this is likely to trigger a reaction 
from the relevant national monetary authorities, who can be expected to attempt to 
stabilise the level of their currency.  This they will do by engaging in open market 
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operations, running down their official reserves to buy their own currency in the face of 
co-ordinated selling.  However, this is not a game which governments can play 
indefinitely.  It is a sobering thought for national policy-makers that the total official 
central bank reserves of all IMF member countries in aggregate is less than the equivalent 
of one day’s turnover on the world’s foreign exchange markets.30
 
  Given the weight of 
capital which can be deployed against a particular currency, therefore, no amount of 
concerted central bank resolve can ever stave off co-ordinated market attacks.  Both 
governments and market dealers know that, should flows of private speculative capital be 
organised collectively with the specific aim to ‘pick off’ individual currencies, then such 
attacks will always succeed.  This knowledge is sufficient in itself to act as a further 
endorsement of the incentive to speculate.  As such, the rash of currency crises which 
currently plague the world’s money markets often bear no relation to the state of 
underlying economic fundamentals.  The foreign exchange market is dominated by short-
term speculators who, in their desire to maximise private liquidity ratios, purposefully 
undermine interest and exchange rate stability.  These rates consequently display a 
greater volatility ceteris paribus than we would otherwise expect.  Furthermore, they are 
frequently moved away, with long-term effect, from levels appropriate to underlying 
economic equilibria. 
Such effects impact particularly severely on the real economy.  For it is the level of 
interest rates which helps to shape investors’ expectations in relation to the feasibility of 
funding future productive investments; and it is the level of exchange rates which helps to 
shape investors’ expectations in relation to the likely market share such investments may 
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be able to capture.  Should speculative activities move both interest and exchange rates 
above their trend level,31
 
 investors holding financial assets face reduced incentives to turn 
these assets into new productive capacity. 
In such circumstances, it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain sufficient productive 
capacity to match labour market demand with supply.  It is the systemic presence of 
excess labour supply which has made western labour so susceptible to globalisation’s 
supposed ‘logic of no alternative’.  The erosion of statutory trade union rights; the 
growing casualisation of work in the advanced industrialised world; the exploitation of 
sweatshop economies by western multinationals; the official tolerance of mass 
unemployment in the European Union: the political costs incurred by western 
governments which allowed all of these adverse labour market trends to persist would no 
doubt be significantly increased in the absence of such acute productive capital shortage.  
It is with this concern for labour standards foremost in mind that the case is put for re-
regulating financial markets as a means of restoring the full circuit of capital.  Given that 
this would mean adjudicating between the contradictory interests of finance and labour 
by prioritising those of the latter, it should be clear that this is both an economic 
argument and a political argument.  However, before such arguments are made, the focus 
of the paper is turned to the question of financial innovation.  The development of a 
whole new genre of financial markets, those in financial futures, has increased liquidity 
ratios in these markets still further.  As a consequence, futures markets act as yet more 
impediments to the restoration of the full circuit of capital and, as such, make the case for 




3. Financial futures and further impediments to the restoration of the full circuit of 
capital 
 
A wide range of markets in financial futures now exists.  A futures contract is entered 
into in an attempt to generate a high degree of certainty about the medium-term market 
price of a given asset.  Indeed, the specified terms of the contract lock in that price at a 
non-negotiable level for the length of the contract.  Futures operate most effectively, 
therefore, in markets such as those for interest and exchange rate futures, in which the 
prices of the underlying assets - in this case, interest and exchange rates themselves - are 
known to be volatile.  Both short-term interest and exchange rates clearly do vary, often 
quite sharply from month to month or even from day to day.  Moreover, the fluctuations 
in these rates often occur in a manner which is difficult to predict.  As we have already 
seen, co-ordinated speculative attacks can move interest and exchange rate levels away 
from those that would be consistent with underlying economic fundamentals.  The 
markets for financial futures were developed, then, in order to offer a means of reducing 
the risks associated with unpredictable short-term movements in interest and exchange 
rates.  Underlying risks can be re-distributed through ‘hedging mechanisms’, allowing for 
portfolios to be ‘immunised’ through offsetting actions in related markets. 
 
Therefore, the markets for financial derivatives emerged as a response to changes in the 
surrounding economic environment.  As the institutional arrangements of the immediate 
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post-war era have been dismantled, the ‘certainties’ which these arrangements guaranteed 
have rapidly dissipated.  The post-Bretton Woods era is one of increased interest and 
exchange rate risk, and new financial innovations have been developed in an attempt to 
reduce exposure to such risk.32
 
  Under a floating exchange rate regime, currency levels 
are determined according to the often volatile sentiments of the foreign exchange 
markets.  This has generated new incentives to engage in hedging activities and, in turn, 
this has generated calls for new markets to meet such demands.  Floating rates create 
exactly the sort of market tensions - those associated with excessive price volatility - 
which futures trading thrives on.  As excessive volatility has become a seemingly 
permanent feature of modern-day financial markets, futures have emerged as an 
important part of modern finance.  We have witnessed explosive growth in the range of 
available short-term financial instruments.  Furthermore, as the issue volume of such 
instruments has shown a similar growth, activities in secondary financial markets now 
rivals that in primary financial markets as a means of diverting money away from the 
productive economy.  Indeed, the fact that trading volumes for interest rate futures have 
intensified to such an extent that they now outnumber those for the related cash markets 
shows quite clearly the extent to which the full circuit of capital is now impeded. 
Futures markets tend to offer unlimited access and, subsequently, are used routinely by 
an increasing number of participants.  New investors have been attracted to derivatives 
markets as these markets have become ever more liquid.  As Dennis Carlton argues, ‘for 
financial instruments, futures markets can sometimes provide an almost perfect substitute 
to a cash purchase of a security’.33  Moreover, futures markets have proved especially 
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successful at lowering transactions costs through the instantaneous nature of trading.  As 
a result of the almost total elimination of transactions costs, Carlton raises the possibility 
that it may even be cheaper to undertake certain transactions in the futures markets than 
the cash markets.  Derivatives markets clearly act as a complement to cash markets, 
therefore; and, as an increasing amount of financial activity becomes concentrated in 
futures, they may act more and more as direct substitutes for cash markets. 
 
The derivatives contracts which have succeeded most often in displacing their cash 
market equivalents have tended to be those which are the most liquid in relative terms.34  
In these markets, the total open positions for financial futures regularly exceed those in 
the associated securities markets.  For example, trading in stock index contracts is often 
more intense than is same-day trading on the international stock exchanges.35  As such, 
we should not be surprised that prices in cash markets frequently reflect trading in the 
derivatives markets, and not vice versa.  This should lead us immediately to revise our 
thinking about futures markets.  As Steil asks: ‘When Chicago futures prices lead NYSE 
cash prices, which product is, economically speaking, a ‘derivative’ of which?’.36  
Houthakker and Williamson raise the same issue when they write: ‘To those accustomed 
to pre-futures ways, it is a clear case of the tail wagging the dog.  The question arises, 
however, which is the tail and which is the dog?’.37  Derivatives markets are now 
instrumental to the process through which prices are formed in cash markets.  As such, 
futures markets now have the capacity to discipline the very same cash markets which 
themselves tend to discipline state-led expansions of the real economy.  Therefore, the 
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dynamics of capital shortage in productive sectors have at least one of their starting 
points in futures markets. 
 
It is perhaps the supreme irony of derivatives trading that the extensive use of futures, 
ostensibly for the purpose of risk management, actually increases the overall risk and 
uncertainty in the economic system.  Thus, the new world order of financial futures is one 
which injects fundamental disorder into other sectors of the economy.  As Barbara 
Carroll observes, there seem to be few obvious theoretical flaws in the assumption that 
futures markets should act to stabilise cash markets, but in practice it appears that the 
exact opposite has more typically been the case.38
 
  Far from eliminating risk from the 
economic system, financial futures actually pose new risks to its efficient functioning, 
especially in terms of productive sectors. 
Two processes need to be explained in relation to this claim.  Both processes require for 
the mobility of capital to be understood in functional terms; each relating in turn to one of 
the two distinct functions which financial futures fulfil.  The first is concerned with the 
way in which futures allow investors to hedge the risk of price uncertainties in the 
underlying cash markets.  As Desmond Fitzgerald explains: ‘Hedgers take a position in 
the futures market such that profits on the futures hedge compensate for losses on the 
underlying cash position’.39  Under passive hedging strategies, then, futures work to lock 
in a value for the underlying position.  Consequently, all potential losses in cash markets 
can be offset by adopting a contrary position in the related futures market.  The virtual 
absence of transactions costs associated with futures contracts ensures that liquidity is 
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maximised through the use of derivatives.  In short, in almost all cases, additional 
liquidity is created through secondary markets in financial instruments.40
 
  With 
derivatives markets being able to satisfy private liquidity demands even in the face of 
possible losses on cash positions, there is little incentive for capital to flow out of cash 
positions and into productive investments.  As a consequence, for an ever larger number 
of potential investors, the circuit of capital both begins and ends in the financial markets. 
The second way in which the markets for financial futures may disrupt the efficient 
functioning of the economic system relates to the second function which these markets 
fulfil: speculation.  Fitzgerald argues that derivatives markets enable speculators ‘to back 
their forecasts with a high degree of leverage’.41  Indeed, insofar as Lillian Chew can be 
assumed to be correct when she suggests that derivatives ‘offer boundless leverage’,42
 
 
then there would appear to be very little standing in the way of these ‘forecasts’ being 
turned into subsequent realities.  Financial futures markets now act as important 
influences on the dynamics through which interest and exchange rates are set.  As a 
consequence, derivatives trading also impacts directly on the real economy.  As we have 
seen, productive sectors have been adversely affected by activities in cash markets which 
have raised the trend level of interest and exchange rates.  Moreover, these 
disequilibrating effects have been multiplied as the speculative activities of derivatives 
traders have injected new sources of volatility into financial prices. 
To explain this further, the futures markets no longer attract only those with passive 
hedging strategies.  Whilst these markets were initiated in order to enable risks to be 
 27 
offset through hedging, their growth has encouraged a more aggressive stance from 
financial investors.  Derivatives can be moulded into any structure desired by potential 
customers.  In this sense, innovation within the financial futures markets is, to a large 
degree, ‘demand-pull’.  That is, speculators in the derivatives markets have demanded 
new, highly liquid futures contracts which offer them expanded profit opportunities.  
Futures not only act as a means of price protection, then; nor do they allow merely for 
profits to be realised from arbitrage between a portfolio of primary securities and related 
derivatives contracts.  When used in either of these ways, the operation of futures markets 
has only a tangential effect on the productive economy.  However, such effects become 
significantly more pronounced when futures markets are used to realise profits through 
pure speculation. 
 
Financial futures markets are now used more for speculative purposes than they are for 
hedging.43  At face value, speculation would seem to involve accepting additional risk.  It 
is somewhat ironic that futures markets were originally established to allow investors to 
hedge against risk but, as these markets have been used to an ever greater extent for 
speculative reasons, they appear to have encouraged investors to take on more risks.  
However, the image of speculation as risk-taking is difficult to maintain in relation to 
futures markets.  Speculators have a hands-on influence in the formation of prices in 
these markets, and this immediately increases their ability to ‘know’ the direction in 
which the market will move.  In effect, they are no longer attempting to predict the 
direction in which the market will move at all, only the extent to which the market will 
move in the designated direction.  To put this another way, it is not a question of whether 
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futures speculators will make a loss or a gain, merely a question of how much profit they 
will realise.  Economics textbooks routinely refer to speculative activity as the attempt to 
take advantage of marginal differences between the given prices of underlying cash 
instruments and related futures contracts.  In practice, though, these prices are anything 
but given.  In fact, they are constantly in flux as a response to the activities of speculators 
themselves.  Speculators are able to increase their own profit margins by opening up 
price differentials between cash and futures markets through concerted one-way betting.  
As Carlton notes, it is a peculiarity of the structure of futures markets that they will 
produce a price ‘that reflects some average of the beliefs of the market participants’.44
 
  It 
is this pricing structure which enables speculators to exploit self-fulfilling prophecies 
should all ‘bets’ in the market prove to be one way.  Futures markets are consequently 
dominated by momentum trading.  As the market trend embodied in momentum trading 
becomes readily identified, the volume of trading tends to increase as more and more 
investors become aware that the trend can, indeed, be their friend.  This ‘knowledge’ 
increases the liquidity of the market, encouraging more investors to join on the side of the 
dominant bet and, as a result, deepening the momentum of the market trend. 
The advent of momentum trading clearly illustrates, particularly in relation to the 
operation of financial futures markets, that it is more useful to think of capital mobility in 
functional terms rather than in spatial terms.  Indeed, the very existence of derivatives 
markets appears to be dependent upon the spatial mobility of capital hypothesis being 
incorrect.  Under the conditions of this hypothesis, capital is assumed to have a privileged 
vantage point from which it can survey all of its available options.  It is therefore able to 
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identify those economies in which it would be able to earn the highest interest premiums 
and, as a result of its rational instincts, will move quickly to exploit these profit 
opportunities.  The subsequent flow of capital across space will impact upon domestic 
money supplies in such a way so as to eliminate the interest rate differentials which 
triggered the spatial capital flows in the first place.  We are thus drawn towards a central 
assumption of the globalisation hypothesis: that all domestic interest rates will, over time, 
be ‘policed’ by speculative activity towards an international average. 
 
Yet derivatives markets only exist at all because such convergence has failed to 
materialise.  Futures require a degree of uncertainty in underlying cash markets to be 
viable.  Indeed, a number of the more successful futures contracts thrive on artificially 
stimulating differences between national interest rates.  For the uncertainty which 
surrounds the ensuing price volatility increases risk premiums.  If, on the other hand, 
capital’s spatial mobility were to eliminate all interest rate differentials, then there would 
be no interest rate uncertainty, no price volatility on financial assets, no risk premiums 
and, consequently, no demand for financial futures.  The continued existence of 
derivatives markets requires for interest rate differentials to persist into the future.  Thus, 
it requires for capital’s spatial mobility to be less than perfect - and certainly more 
constrained than it is so frequently made to appear in the assumptions of the dominant 
discourse of globalisation.  Instead of focusing on the spatial mobility of capital, we can 
learn more about the destabilising effect of financial futures on the real economy by 
concentrating on the functional mobility of capital.  Financial and futures markets have, 
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over recent years, devoured an ever growing proportion of available capital funds; 
pointing, once again, to the fundamental functional immobility of capital. 
 
Moreover, insofar as technological advances and financial liberalisation have intensified 
the linkages between different markets, the introduction of a range of derivative 
instruments have intensified them still further.  Derivatives thrive on the intimate 
relationship embodied in trading the same financial instrument between primary and 
secondary markets.  As a consequence, shocks emerging in one market are unlikely to be 
contained within that market alone.  Indeed, the derivatives markets act as a diffusion 
mechanism, transferring one market’s shocks into a number of other markets. 
 
In the presence of such spill-over effects, public policy becomes increasingly difficult to 
co-ordinate.  Monetary policy, in particular, becomes less exact.  The explosion in the 
volume of derivatives contracts currently being traded is associated with an increase in 
the volatility of interest rates.  However, the rate of interest no longer reflects solely the 
state of underlying economic fundamentals.  As such, and contrary to the most basic law 
of textbook economics, the demand for money has become increasingly divorced from its 
price.  That is, the demand for money has now become increasingly de-sensitised to 
fluctuations in interest rates.  Thus, whilst derivatives contracts enable the financial 
markets to overcome obstacles to their efficient functioning, they also remove the 
government’s capacity to engage in macroeconomic management on its own terms.  If 
this capacity is to be restored, then the financial markets’ ability to innovate at will must 
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be brought to heel.  It is this assertion which dominates calls for the re-regulation of 
financial markets and also, therefore, the conclusion of this paper. 
 
 
Conclusion: The case for strategic re-regulation 
 
The scope of this paper is inadequate for any detailed discussion of the most effective 
means of re-regulating the international financial environment.  It is sufficient at this 
stage merely to challenge one of the most entrenched orthodoxies of our times: that 
relating to capital’s supposed ‘hyper-mobility’.  As such, this paper has had two main 
themes running through it.  Firstly, it has been shown that the spatial mobility of capital 
is far more limited than it is made to appear in the political rhetoric of globalisation.  As a 
consequence, and in direct contradiction of the received wisdom, this has demonstrated 
that the strategic re-regulation of financial markets remains possible (albeit, in all 
likelihood, only at a supra-national level).  Secondly, by focusing subsequently on the 
question of the functional mobility of capital, it has been shown that there are compelling 
reasons, of both an economic and a political nature, to argue that the re-regulation of 
financial markets is not only possible, but also necessary. 
 
The overriding aim of any new legislation would be to encourage the restoration of the 
full circuit of capital; that is, to use political interventions to create an economic 
environment in which there are sufficient incentives for those that hold financial assets to 
turn these assets into productive investments.  The functional immobility of capital 
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impedes the flow of funds into production.  In order to create a new market equilibrium 
which is more attentive to the needs of the real economy, it would appear to be necessary 
for a new regulatory regime to be inserted into market relations with a view to changing 
the relative incentives between holding capital as money and holding capital as 
productive assets.   The goal of political interventions, then, would be to reduce the level 
of liquidity available in the financial sectors and, as a result, bring financial liquidity 
ratios more in line with those available in the real economy. 
 
The successful restoration of the full circuit of capital is a necessary, although insufficient 
condition for the elevation of labour’s relative position in the political hierarchy of global 
economic interests.  Therefore, the prior re-regulation of financial market activity appears 
to be essential should we wish to see the end of restrictive labour practices based on the 
notion of competitive austerity.45  For, driven by (empirically unsustainable) assumptions 
about capital’s spatial mobility, western governments now routinely attempt to outbid 
each other in the inward investment game in relation to how competitively - and, for 
‘competitively’, read ‘cheaply’ - they can market their respective workforces.  According 
to the dominant discourse of globalisation, the presumed penalty for adopting any other 
stance is mass capital flight, as footloose investors search overseas for lower-cost 
locations.  As a consequence, western growth is increasingly assumed to have become 
ever more dependent upon injecting a downward dynamic onto real wages.  The result 
has been an increase in the ability of capitalist class actors to discipline the claims of 
labour on the one hand, and, in circumstances in which wage cuts are resisted, an increase 
in the under-employment of labour on the other. 
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Such a story of the long-term effects of capital’s spatial mobility can indeed be made to 
appear compelling.  For there are numerous examples of its predictions supposedly 
coming ‘true’.  There can be little doubt that western labour is under-utilised; both mass 
unemployment in Western Europe and the increasing casualisation of work throughout 
the advanced industrialised world suggest as much.  Similarly, labour is becoming ever 
more subordinate to capital; statutory trade union rights are being dismantled in the west 
at exactly the same time that western multinationals are increasing their exploitation of 
sweatshop economies in the developing world.  However, just because the ‘effects’ of 
globalisation are visible does not necessarily mean that globalisation can be used to 
explain their cause.  That western labour markets currently fail to clear quite so 
conspicuously is not due to direct wage competition from the newly industrialising 
economies.  It is the result of a situation of systemic productive capital shortage.  This 
tendency cannot be explained in terms of capital’s spatial mobility.  Instead, it requires 
that we re-think capital mobility in functional terms. 
 
The integration of the world’s major financial markets effectively into a single, round-
the-clock exchange has increased the liquidity of these markets; moreover, liquidity 
options have been heightened still further by the creation of a range of markets in 
financial futures.  Subsequently, such markets have begun to devour an ever greater 
proportion of available capital funds.  Potential investors are attracted to these markets by 
the allure of almost instantaneous profits which such liquidity offers.  However, as a 
result, less and less capital is being prepared for use in productive sectors.  In the ensuing 
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circumstances of capital shortfall, labour supply exceeds labour demand.  It is this 
process which leads not only to labour being under-utilised, but also enhances its 
susceptibilities to the political demands of capitalist class actors. 
 
Consequently, the heightened subordination of labour visible in the era of putative 
globalisation is not economically-determined by capital’s supposedly unlimited spatial 
mobility.  Instead, it is a political outcome contingent upon the prior creation of a global 
neo-liberal financial environment which acts to impede the full circuit of capital.  As 
such, we must be clear that the most significant choices involved in the regulation of 
financial markets are, by nature, normative.  As Geoffrey Underhill argues: 
Ultimately, the complexities of capital adequacy, regulatory boundaries, risk 
management and investor protection escape the boundaries of technocracy.  They 
are linked to questions of what sorts of societies we want to live in.46
If we wish to live in a society whose political economy is significantly different to the 
one we experience today, then it has been the argument of this paper that we must begin 
by re-regulating financial market activity. 
 
 
It is in this sense that this article should be seen as contributing to the themes of the 
special issue.  The ‘P’ has been put back into IPE in this case through reverting to the 
type of analysis which typified the classical political economy of the nineteenth century.  
The arguments contained in this paper should have been seen as an attempt to repoliticise 
the received wisdom of globalisation through reasserting each of what Andrew Gamble 




  The conventional focus on the spatial mobility of capital highlights 
primarily a ‘scientific discourse’, as it concentrates on the way in which the political 
economy of globalisation operates as a social system of enhanced exit options for capital.  
In turn, the ‘practical discourse’ of policy tends merely to be read off from the 
assumption that the perfect spatial mobility of capital conjures a political logic of no 
alternative.  However, the actual scientific status of such a claim is much in doubt.  
Indeed, it is contradicted by the available empirical evidence, which suggests that it is 
necessary to play down the significance of the spatial mobility hypothesis.  Instead, by 
emphasising the functional mobility of capital, the political context for economic policy-
making appears far less closed than it is made to look in the received wisdom of 
globalisation.  Moreover, the adoption of this latter theoretical perspective allows once 
more for a ‘normative discourse’, concerning the ideal form of state-economy relations, 
to be injected into economic interpretations of the globalisation phenomenon. 
In fact, the terms on which such a phenomenon is to be understood are fundamentally 
changed by working with a sufficiently repoliticised IPE capable of analysing the 
normative, as well as the positive, aspects of international financial flows.  In adopting 
the perspective outlined in this paper, for instance, there is no need to assert that the 
emergence of globalising tendencies represents a qualitative shift in the contours of 
contemporary capitalism associated with the reprojection of the capital relation into an 
autonomous sphere of global market relations.  The ‘new’ international political economy 
of which Colin Hay and David Marsh talk in the introduction to this volume is therefore 
not a ‘new’ object of analysis: one cast in the image of the more or less perfect spatial 
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mobility of capital.  Rather, globalising tendencies are assumed here to be indicative of a 
change in the balance of political forces which underpin the capitalist economy.  
Therefore, the attempt to put the ‘P’ back into IPE in this instance signifies a desire to 
repoliticise the way in which the essentially political construction of globalisation is 
viewed.  In this sense, then, the ‘new’ international political economy advanced here 
relates more closely to the development of ‘new’ modes of analysis. 
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